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The right to vote has been irrefutably established as one of the most treasured and fundamental rights 
guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution, and Wisconsin’s Act 23 (“Act 23”) violates 
this standard. In May 2011, the Wisconsin legislature passed this act, which mandated that any person 
attempting to vote in person or via absentee ballot had to present an approved form of government-issued 
photo identification. In application, Act 23 would fail to satisfy its main goal of preventing voter fraud 
because, had it not been enjoined in March 2012, the law would not have prevented any of the limited 
attempts at voter fraud that have already occurred in the state. In the modern era of jurisprudence, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has determined that this right is so fundamental that any attempt to limit or 
violate it must be met with an extraordinarily close and careful examination, and any such examination 
would find Act 23 to be unconstitutional. The process of obtaining a valid form of identification is a 
great burden for the state’s poor, minority and elderly citizens, and this burden is not met with a 
necessary and narrowly tailored law sufficient to justify the equal protection injuries inflicted on the voting 
population. Act 23 also violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment by not offering a completely free form of 
identification for indigent citizens, thereby creating a poll tax. Lastly, the Wisconsin Constitution has a 
complete article on suffrage and on the conditions necessary for changing voting laws, which Act 23 fails 
to meet, rendering it unconstitutional at both the state and federal levels. 
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There is no right “more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of 
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”2 The electoral process is 
structured in a way that is meant to maintain the integrity of the democratic system,3 and the ability to 
vote is the right to participate in that process. Even the structure of the Constitution indicates that the 
right to vote is of the most fundamental significance; therefore, the electoral process is understood to 
come with some regulation in order to preserve the integrity of that right.4 This regulation, however, is 
designed to guide the electoral process and to improve its efficiency, not to make it more difficult for 
citizens to participate in the political franchise.5  
The right to vote has always been an important issue to citizens, and the problem with suffrage 
in the past has not been its significance but rather the reasons why certain citizens are given these rights 
and others are not.6 In the modern era of voting rights, the Supreme Court has determined that, because 
this right is so fundamental, any limitation or violation of it must be examined closely and carefully.7 Our 
law prohibits factors such as wealth, race, and creed from determining a citizen’s ability to exercise the 
right to vote and recognizes that any introduction of such factors as evidence of a voter’s qualifications is 
irrelevant and wayward.8 But historically, this notion did not always reflect the mindset in this country; 
moreover, certain examples of those unequal suffrage principles, such as barriers to voting for  
Black citizens, arguably might be resurfacing in present-day laws. 
In May 2011, the Wisconsin legislature passed 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (“Act 23”).9 The Act 
mandated that in order to vote in person or via absentee ballot, a voter had to present an approved form 
of government-issued photo identification.10 This Note will examine the scope of this law, its effects on 
citizens, and its constitutionality, and it will suggest recommendations for addressing the failure of Act 
23 to satisfy any of its goals in a manner that justifies the burdens it places on Wisconsin citizens.  
This Note is divided into three parts. Part II will discuss the history of voting rights in its 
entirety. Voting rights, and the groups allowed to exercise those rights, have gone through many changes 
in the two centuries since the ratification of the Constitution. In order to recognize how Act 23 may be 
reversing some of the progress made with regard to suffrage, it is important to understand how suffrage 
rights have not always been available to all citizens. Part III will examine the development of voter 
identification laws generally, looking specifically at what spurred their conception and at three important 
judicial decisions regarding state voter identification laws that were challenged on various grounds. Part 
IV will provide an analysis of the Wisconsin voter ID law, will argue that it violates both the U.S. 
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution, and will urge that it be struck down as unconstitutional 
and for the burdens it places on Wisconsin’s citizens. This section will also address the prevalent 
counterarguments for its validity and necessity, namely, the existence of voter fraud and the act’s ability 
to impede such fraud. 
                                                      
2 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
3 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 
4 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). 
5 Id. at 433–35. 
6 See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667–68 (1966) (discussing the arguments for and 
against the existence of a fee requirement for exercising the right to vote).  
7 Id. at 667 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964)). 
8 Id. at 668.  
9 Wisconsin Act 23, 2011 WIS. LEGIS. SERV. 1 (West) (codified in scattered sections of WIS. STAT. §§ 5.02–
343.50).  
10 Id. at §§ 1, 2.
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II.  THE PROGRESSION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Pre-Civil War 
From very early on in the history of the country, there has been a link between the right to vote 
and a requirement of proof that one qualifies as a member of the electorate.11 Since the eighteenth 
century, disenfranchisement has been a consistent theme in voting laws. At every juncture in the tale of 
American suffrage, there has been at least one group of people, most often Black citizens or the poor, 
whose rights to vote have been under attack. 
The original text of the Constitution is essentially silent with regard to the voting rights of 
citizens and does not make any concrete suppositions about who might be allowed to vote and under 
what conditions.12 The voting guidelines in the Constitution are explained fairly directly, but they do not 
detail the composition of the electorate responsible for choosing representatives, nor do they state which 
legislators will choose the senators; these decisions are left to the states.13 
In determining how to proceed with elections, most states used a similar method to define which 
individuals were eligible to vote and which ones were not. On close examination of the history of 
suffrage rights in the states before the Civil War, it appears that the requirement of a form of 
“identification” in order to exercise one’s right to vote is not a particularly new one; in fact, it has existed 
since the early days following the ratification of the Constitution.14 Unlike today’s requirements of proof 
of identity, however, the original requirement was more akin to an identification of economic status.15 In 
order to vote, an individual needed to demonstrate that he had a stake in the economy of the locality in 
which he wished to vote.16 Most states implemented this condition by requiring that a potential voter 
own property, either real property or a minimum of $300 to $500 worth of personal property, depending 
on the state.17 The effect of this voting requirement was that only wealthy white men were allowed to 
vote, a result that persisted for decades.18 
Eventually, as the country grew, the property requirement became less feasible because it 
excluded certain desirable voters, particularly in the South, from voting.19 In North Carolina alone, the 
property requirement disenfranchised approximately fifty thousand eligible white men. 20  With the 
                                                      
11 C. VANN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH: ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 331–32 
(Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). 
12 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 12–18 (1964). The case delivers a comprehensive dialogue of the factors 
that were taken into consideration by the Framers in determining how the right to vote would be dictated in the 
Constitution. One of the major issues discussed in this debate was the question of how citizens of the states would be 
represented in the legislative body of the federal government.  
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, II. The Constitution explains that “the People of the several States” are to choose 
their representatives for the House of Representatives and that state legislators shall choose the members of the Senate 
for their respective states. Id. art. I, §2, cl. 1. The Constitution goes on to explain that the President and Vice President of 
the country will be elected using the Electoral College system. Id. art. II, §1, cl. 1–4. 
14 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 8–10 (2000) (discussing the movements of the 1950s and 1960s that brought about voting and civil 
rights and other historically related topics).  
15 Id. at 9, 29.  
16 Id. 
17 VANN WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 331. 
18 KEYSSAR, supra note 14, at 9 (suggesting that only white men with property were significantly affected by the 
law in a capacity that earned them the privilege of voting and that the interests of those without property could be 
adequately represented by these wealthy white men). 
19 Id. at 40–42. 
20 Id. at 41. 
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increase in would-be voters demanding their right to vote, the property requirement finally met its 
complete demise in the mid-1800’s.21 However, as the country moved past the Civil War, new methods 
for restricting suffrage rights began to develop. 
B.  Reconstruction 
During Reconstruction, the recent enemies in the North and the South attempted to resolve 
their differences and unify as one country; it was a time of incredible volatility in United States politics, 
the effects of which were felt in voter disenfranchisement policies.22  
Reconstruction witnessed the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the 
beginning of federal, as opposed to state, control over voting rights.23 The Reconstruction Amendments 
planted the seed of a new conceptualization of the right to vote and memorialized a promise that states 
could not infringe on the rights of United States citizens.  
The Fourteenth Amendment defines a citizen of the United States as any “person born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” and protects such citizens’ 
“privileges or immunities.”24 The Fifteenth Amendment complements the Fourteenth and provides that 
the right of citizens “to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”25 Though the language in the Amendments 
seems clear, several courts throughout history, including the Supreme Court, have found ways to recast 
the Amendments in a manner that denies certain citizens the right to vote. One of the clearest examples 
of this perverse interpretation is the case of Minor v. Happersett, in which a woman was denied the right to 
vote and the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect voting rights.26 
1.  Minor v .  Happerse t t 27 
Virginia Minor was a native-born citizen of Missouri.28 She was over the age of twenty-one, she 
met all the necessary requirements for voting (including the unofficial requirement of being white), and 
still she was refused the right to register to vote in the general election of 1872.29 In rendering its 
decision, the Supreme Court agreed that within the definition provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Minor was a citizen and was therefore entitled to the protection of her privileges and immunities.30 Still, 
                                                      
21 Id. at 42. 
22 For a more detailed discussion on political disenfranchisement during the Reconstruction period and the 
political violence that accompanied it, see VERNON LANE WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865–1890, at 181–
206 (1984); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 279, 342–44, 425–
44 (1988); Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments & the State Action Syllogism: A Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1397–1414 (2009). 
23 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified in 1868 and 1870, respectively. For a more in-
depth analysis of the Reconstruction Amendments and their interplay with racial discord and suffrage rights, see Henry 
L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25 Id. amend. XV, § 1. 
26 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 163 (1874). 
27 Though the case involves the voting rights of women, its use in this Note is not to highlight the women’s 
suffrage movement but rather to exemplify how some laws have been used historically to prevent the granting of voting 
rights. This Note discusses both race and gender in explaining the history of voting rights and recognizes the difference 
between the two. However, these differences will not be addressed because, for the purposes of this Note, those 
differences are irrelevant. 
28 Minor, 88 U.S. at 163. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 165. 
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in a decision that prevented suffrage rights from being granted to women, the Court held that the right 
to vote was not one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31 
According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did not add to the privileges or immunities 
of citizens; it merely “furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as [they] already had.”32 
Therefore, unless Minor’s right to vote existed in her state at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the right was not protected.33 The Court’s opinion stated that birthright citizenship was not 
enough to guarantee a right to vote and that groups of citizens could still be disenfranchised under the 
aegis of the law,34 a trend that continued throughout the Jim Crow era in the South. 
C.  Jim Crow 
Just as Minor v. Happersett illustrates how the law might be used to exclude individuals from the 
right to vote, the Jim Crow era provides many examples of laws and rules that were created specifically 
for that purpose.35 
Prevented by the Fifteenth Amendment from using race as a justification for the denial of 
suffrage rights, the former Confederate states found other ways to disenfranchise Black and African 
American36 voters.37 The lawmakers of the Jim Crow era blatantly attempted to prevent Black citizens 
from voting by creating qualifications that were intended solely to keep these individuals from registering 
as voters.38  
1.  Poll Taxes 
Depending on one’s point of view, the measures taken by the former Confederate states at the 
turn of the twentieth century relating to voting rights may be considered ingenious or abhorrent. The 
poll tax was an extremely effective tool used by many southern states to exclude numerous voters—
mostly Black voters—who were deemed unfit for participation in the electorate.39 While not directly 
discriminating against anyone, the poll tax, like earlier property requirements, kept poorer individuals out 
of the process by requiring voters to meet a certain economic status. The cleverness of the poll tax was 
in its simplicity; it kept people from voting because it was expensive.40 That slavery was abolished only a 
few decades prior to the introduction of poll taxes and that most Black voters consequently did not have 
                                                      
31 Id. at 178. 
32 Id. at 171. 
33 Id. 
34 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170–74 (1874). 
35 The Jim Crow era was a period that lasted roughly from the 1890s until the mid-1960s. See Ronald L. F. 
Davis, Creating Jim Crow: In-Depth Essay, DIABLO VALLEY COLLEGE, 
http://voyager.dvc.edu/~mpowell/afam/creating2.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2012), for a more in-depth explanation of 
the beginning of this era, its impact on the country, and the negative effects it had on the country. 
36 It is recognized that there are differences between the definitions of what makes a person Black and what 
makes a person African American. This Note will use both terms interchangeably, with both denoting people that would 
identify themselves as members of either group. 
37 E. Earl Parson & Monique McLaughlin, The Persistence of Racial Bias in Voting: Voter ID, the New Battleground for 
Pretextual Race Neutrality, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 75, 78 (2007). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 64, 72 (1974).. 
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the assets to cover the tax resulted in the exclusion of the vast majority of Black people from the right to 
vote.41 
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the last of the state poll taxes was 
eliminated. States like Alabama and Mississippi held out until federal law made the poll tax illegal, but 
some states, such as North Carolina, rid themselves of the tax before they were required to do so.42 The 
damage, however, had already been done, in large part well before the end of the poll tax era.43 In the 
twenty years between 1885 and 1905, the rate of participation of Black voters in the electoral process 
dropped from ninety-eight percent to a low of ten percent.44 During this period, courts throughout the 
country upheld the constitutionality of state poll taxes, thereby increasing their effectiveness and use.45 
2.  Supreme Court Approves Exclusion 
As the nineteenth century transitioned into the twentieth, there was no apparent end in sight for 
state efforts to disenfranchise the Black voting population. Starting most prominently with the decision 
in Williams v. Mississippi,46 the Supreme Court and other courts heard various challenges to the validity of 
poll taxes and consistently ruled in favor of their constitutionality.47 Two such cases, Breedlove v. Stuttles48 
and Butler v. Thompson,49 are ubiquitously cited for their holdings and reasoning. 
In Breedlove, the question before the court was whether a Georgia statute requiring every citizen 
to pay a poll tax before he or she could register to vote was constitutional.50 The appellant in Breedlove, a 
twenty-eight year-old white man, was unable to register to vote because he had failed to pay the requisite 
poll taxes.51 Mr. Breedlove filed suit against the tax collector on the grounds that the denial of his 
registration violated the Equal Protection and the Privileges or Immunities clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.52 The Court explained that the privilege of voting comes not from the United States but 
rather from the individual states, and that the states are not prohibited by the Constitution from defining 
                                                      
41 J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 670–
71 (1995). 
42 See Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court and Black Disenfranchisement, U. VA. L. SCH. PUB. L. LEGAL THEORY 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 8 (T2005), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=uvalwps) 
(explaining that only three states—North Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida—had done away with the poll tax before they 
were required to do so). 
43 It is clear that during this time period there were more factors than just poll taxes that were at work in 
preventing Black voters from casting their votes, namely voter harassment and intimidation from organizations such as 
the Ku Klux Klan. Because the focus of this Note is on the effects of written law on suffrage rights, that social issue and 
certain others will not be discussed in detail. For a deeper discussion on political violence during this period, see Gabriel 
J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 65, 83–96 (2008). 
44 Kousser, supra note 40, at 174. 
45 See, e.g., id. at 262.  
46 Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
47 Williams involved an African American who appealed his conviction on the grounds that the composition of 
his jury was not constitutional. The jury makeup was based on a Mississippi statute that required potential jurors to pay 
poll taxes before being eligible to become a juror. The Court found that the language of the poll taxes did not 
discriminate on the basis of race and was valid. Justice McKenna stated that the poll tax laws of Mississippi did “not on 
their face discriminate between the races, and it [was not] shown that their actual administration was evil; only that evil 
was possible under them.” Id. at 225. 
48 Breedlove v. Stuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
49 Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va. 1951), aff’d, 341 U.S. 937 (1951). 
50 Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 279–80. 
51 Id. at 280. 
52 Id. 
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voting rights as they see fit as long as they do not violate the Fifteenth or Nineteenth Amendments.53 
The Court then held that poll tax payment was ingrained in the history of reasonable regulation in 
Georgia and other states54 and that Georgia’s measures reasonably could have been deemed essential to 
that form of levy.55 
Nearly fifteen years later, the Court affirmed a decision made in another southern state, Virginia, 
with virtually the same outcome. In Butler v. Thompson, the appellant, an African American woman, was 
refused the opportunity to vote on the ground that she had not paid the required poll taxes for several 
preceding years, a problem that was compounded by the cumulative nature of unpaid poll taxes.56 Butler 
argued, inter alia, that the poll tax requirement was “invalid because of the evil motives of the draftsmen 
of the Virginia Constitution of 1902 and subsequent poll taxes”57 and that the poll tax requirement 
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.58 As in Breedlove, the district court held that the poll 
tax law did not violate the Constitution and that voting is a privilege created by the states and not the 
national government.59 Perhaps more disturbing than its decision was the court’s response to Butler’s 
contention that the poll taxes were the product of hatred for Black voters. The court admitted that the 
participants in the 1902 Virginia Constitutional Convention manifested a desire to create poll tax laws in 
order to exclude the African American vote but claimed that they wanted to bring about this result “by 
means that were valid under the Federal Constitution or Federal laws.”60 Butler was decided in 1951, only 
one or two generations removed from the penning of this paper, while the Supreme Court was still 
maintaining the constitutionality of laws that had been concededly created solely for the purpose of 
invidious discrimination and disenfranchisement. These laws continued to serve as the status quo for 
voting rights for another decade until the national Civil Rights Movement brought about their demise. 
3.  The Death of Jim Crow 
The first big step toward ending class and race-based disenfranchisement was the ratification of 
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in 1964. This Amendment ended half a century of 
voter suppression by giving U.S. citizens the ability to vote in all federal elections without being required, 
by either the federal or state governments, to pay a poll tax.61 In the same year, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 barred unequal application of voter registration requirements and significantly undermined the 
legality of facially discriminatory laws in the states.62 A third major accomplishment of the mid-1960’s, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, gave the Justice Department fairly broad powers to initiate lawsuits 
involving discrimination claims based on denial of suffrage rights.63  
                                                      
53 Id. at 283. 
54 Id. at 283–84. 
55 Id. at 284. 
56 Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17, 19–21 (E.D. Va. 1951), aff’d, 341 U.S. 937 (1951). 
57 Id. at 20. 
58 Id. at 19. 
59 Id. at 22. The district court judge claimed, “To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to 
deny any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the 
United States, but is conferred by the state and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and 
other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate.” Id. (citing, inter 
alia, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170 (1874)). 
60 Id. at 21. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
62 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
63 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006). 
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The final blow to the formalized Jim Crow south was Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.64 
Harper involved a suit by Virginia residents who challenged the constitutionality of the state’s poll tax.65 
A three-judge panel at the district court level dismissed the complaint in accordance with Breedlove, and 
the Supreme Court heard the case on appeal.66 The Court described the appellants simply as residents of 
the state, failing to mention at the outset that they were Black and that they were employed in low-
income professions.67 The Court concluded that the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because it involved invidious discrimination against those who could not afford to pay the tax.68 
However, the Court did not address the fact that the tax had overwhelming effects on African American 
voters, and it hardly mentioned the word “race,” even while making its decision during one of the most 
racially divided periods of the century.69  
The most important holdings from Harper were the designation of voting as a fundamental right 
and the striking down of the poll tax—the most effective tool of disenfranchisement—as 
unconstitutional.70 The essence of the opinion and the reason why it departed from precedent regarding 
poll taxes were captured in the words of Justice Douglas when he said: 
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted 
under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them 
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. Those principles apply here. For to 
repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the 
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.71  
At the same time, it is important to notice that even at the level of the Supreme Court, there was 
still a deep-seated battle between those who viewed the right to vote as fundamental and those who 
believed that the right was not absolute and that barriers should be left in place if the states desired them. 
These competing viewpoints resulted in the creation of a test that set standards for voting laws but 
carved out a way to preserve some level of deference to the states. 
                                                      
64 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
65 Id. at 664. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 666. 
69 The rationale for why the Supreme Court chose to write an opinion in which it did not describe the 
appellants as anything more than residents is unexplained, but considering that the opinion was written in the same 
period as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, one might draw the conclusion 
that it did so in order to de-racialize the poll tax. Regardless of the rationale, however, the fact that the Court only 
mentioned Black (or “Negro”) citizens in reference to separate public facilities and to make it clear that it did not believe 
poll taxes were being used to deny these citizens their right to vote might signify either naiveté or willful blindness to the 
truth behind the poll tax laws. But when one examines the makeup of the Court at the time, nine white men, and 
considers that Justice Black, who wrote a dissenting opinion, was formerly a member of the Ku Klux Klan, perhaps the 
rationale behind the description of the appellants becomes clearer: during a volatile period in race relations, the Court 
chose to write an opinion based on the law as it interpreted it rather than using race as a lynchpin. 
70 Three justices dissented from the decision in Harper, in two dissenting opinions. Justice Black dissented on 
the grounds that according to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was the job of Congress to pass laws that 
protected the rights guaranteed by the Amendment, not the job of the Court to make that decision. Id. at 678–79 (Black, 
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, said that the Equal Protection Clause does not necessarily 
guarantee social equality amongst citizens, that the constitutionality of a poll tax hinged on whether it had a rational 
basis, and that the poll tax at issue met this standard. Justice Harlan even went on to suggest that a poll tax could be 
supported by the arguments that it helps to “weed out those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay [the 
tax,]” that people with the means to pay the tax have more credentials to vote, and that the country would be better 
managed if only they could exercise that right. Id. at 681–82, 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
71 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
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D.  Balancing the Burdens on Voters 
The Supreme Court developed a balancing test for voter laws in two decisions. The first, 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, addressed the constitutionality of Ohio’s requirement that independent presidential 
hopefuls file for candidacy earlier than party candidates.72 The Court held that not every restrictive state 
voting law was necessarily unconstitutional and that states had the right to apply reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions on the right to vote.73 The proper test, according to the Court, was first to 
consider the “character and magnitude” of the injury to the plaintiff under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and then to “identify and evaluate” the state interests presented as a justification for the 
rule.74 When weighing these two factors, the court must first consider how the state’s interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff, and only then make a decision regarding the law’s constitutionality.75 
This balancing analysis by the Court has been named the Burdick Test after the second decision 
that helped to shape it, Burdick v. Takushi.76 In Burdick, a registered voter in Hawaii claimed that the 
state’s prohibition of write-in voting unreasonably infringed upon the rights of voters under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.77 The Court held that “having a voice” in the election process is a “precious” 
right, but that it is a right to participate in a structured process.78 In making its decision, the Court 
employed the balancing test laid out in Anderson with the added proviso that a court must analyze the 
gravity of the injury to the voter’s rights before weighing the voter’s interest against that of the state.79 
When the restrictions on the voter’s rights are severe, the state law must be narrowly tailored to advance 
                                                      
72 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 780 (1983). 
73 Id. at 788. 
74 Id. at 789. Justice Stevens clarified: 
[A] court . . . must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must 
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and 
strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in 
a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.  
Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
77 Id. at 430. 
78 Id. at 441. 
79 Id. at 434. Justice White explained the approach as follows: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that 
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for 
the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.  
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law 
depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the 
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a 
state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify the restrictions. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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a compelling state interest; if the imposition is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, an important state 
interest is sufficient to support the law.80 The Court still applies this standard. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 
A.  Federal Acts 
Until the end of the last century, the federal government had very limited involvement in the 
regulation of suffrage rights. Since the majority of the decisions regarding the right to vote had been 
handled by the states, the range of different rules and requirements was expansive. This section will 
explain the federal laws that were passed at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first, and will address both their purposes and their effects on general suffrage rights in 
America.81 
1.  National Voter Registration Act 
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also called the “Motor Voter Law,” was 
the first major piece of federal legislation enacted explicitly to influence the actions of voters and states, 
specifically by allowing citizens to register to vote while applying for a driver’s license. Not to be 
confused with the Voting Rights Act discussed above, one purpose of the NVRA was to enhance 
participation of eligible citizens in the electoral process.82 In essence, this Act made it easier for citizens 
to exercise their right to vote, thereby decreasing the levels of disenfranchisement across the nation. The 
NVRA removed nonvoting as a valid reason for a state to remove voters from registration records.83 It 
also required states to accept mail-in registration forms, which, by default, prevented states from 
requiring the in-person registration that they had been using as an opportunity to check voter 
identification.84 Other provisions required fairly complicated procedures to remove voters who had 
changed addresses from registration rolls,85 and allowed those voters to vote in the precincts of their old 
or new addresses.86 Opponents of the NVRA claimed that these new standards only made it more 
difficult for polling places to maintain the integrity of elections and that the Act made it easier for 
dishonest citizens to vote under the names of others.87 Over time, these opponents sought a way to even 
out what they claimed to be unfair, and the Help America Vote Act was a strong start in that direction. 
                                                      
80 Id. 
81 The focus of this Note is the Wisconsin voter identification law; however, since 2001 there have been 
approximately 1,000 bills that have been introduced in forty-six states to somehow tie voting to a form of identification. 
Twenty-six states have passed major legislation since 2003 and those states are Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. For more information on these laws see Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/voter-id-state-
requirements.aspx (last updated Oct. 24, 2012). 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b) (describing the purposes for the act as a whole). 
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b) (2006) (disallowing states to remove voters from registration records unless they 
followed a complicated procedure only applicable to specific groups). 
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4 (necessitating that states accept from voters a standard federal mail-in registration 
form). 
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b). 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(e) (specifying the various options available to a voter that moves from one voting 
jurisdiction to another). 
87 See JOHN H. FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR DEMOCRACY 24 
(Encounter Books 2d ed. 2004) (listing data that suggests American citizens would prefer a voter identification 
requirement). 
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2.  Help America Vote Act of 2002 
Seven years after NVRA was enacted, the elections calamity of 2000 provided an opportunity for 
proponents of voter identification requirements to seek a path of implementation for voter ID laws. 
During the 2000 elections, thirty-one states did not have requirements that voters prove or verify their 
identity at polling places.88 Four of these states had optional identification requests, nine required voters 
simply to state their names in order to vote, and eighteen required voters to sign a poll book.89 The 
remaining states required each voter either to show proof of identity through a wide range of possible 
documentary forms or to provide a signature at the polling place that would be compared to a signature 
made elsewhere.90 
The presidential elections of 2000 and state voting requirements during that time are particularly 
relevant to the subsequent explosion of state voter identification requirements because of the immense 
voter problems that led to the contested outcome of that race. The problems with the Florida ballots91 
brought a surplus of attention to the election processes of both that state and the country as a whole92 
and resulted in Congress’ grueling passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).93 The Act 
aimed to reform the voting system and attempted to ensure that another event like the one in Florida did 
not happen again by preventing voter fraud, especially in the voter registration systems in the states.94 
HAVA mandated the creation of a nationwide database of voter registrants and the uniform and regular 
maintenance of state lists, and required mail-in voters to designate that they were citizens and over 
eighteen.95 HAVA also included a voter identification requirement.96 
This identification provision required that mail-in registrants who had not previously voted in 
the state show proof of identification either upon registration or arrival at the polling location for the 
first time. 97  The requirement could be fulfilled by submitting a utility bill, paycheck, or other 
government-approved document showing name and address, or by providing a driver’s license number 
                                                      
88 See Election Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why 2000–2006, ELECTIONLINE (2006), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/election_reform/electionline_022006.pdf 
(discussing the 2000 elections and the voter identification requirements of the states). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. The range of possibilities even within the states that required some sort of proof of identity was quite 
varied. For documentary proof, states allowed documents such as utility bills, credit cards and leases. For signatures, 
some states compared them to signatures that were already officially on file, and some states compared them to the 
signatures that were on a piece of identification presented by the voter. 
91 The 2000 Presidential elections, specifically what occurred in Florida, drew significant attention to the way 
voting was taking place in the various states. In Florida specifically, due to a close initial count of the ballots, there were 
several recounts of all ballots along with a Supreme Court decision (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)) which together, 
declared Bush the winner of the election. For more detail on the Florida election, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote 
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006). 
92 Id. at 693 (arguing that the problems that arose in Florida opened people’s eyes to the electoral systems 
across the country). 
93 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§15301–15545 
(Supp. IV 2004)). See also Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 426–28 
(2004) (detailing the complications in the passage and the legislative history of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 
including the fourteen month process of back-and-forth discussion between the parties on what would be included in 
the act and the shift in power from the Republicans to the Democrats). 
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2002) (listing specific requirements for the computerization of statewide voter 
registration lists and mail-in registration). 
95 Id. 
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(1)-(3) (2002). 
97 Id. 
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or the last four digits of a Social Security number.98 Though this provision in HAVA was one of the 
most limited in terms of its effects, it served as a springboard for proponents of voter identification laws 
to push forward with state legislation in that regard.99  
When HAVA was passed, only eleven states were in compliance with its voter identification 
requirement. 100  This fact pushed states to act quickly, and legislators who favored strict voter 
identification laws used it as an opportunity to get such laws passed.101 HAVA included a stipulation that 
arguably supported the proposition for strict voter identification laws; the Act specified that its 
requirements were minimal and that states were free to enact stricter rules as long as they did not clash 
with federal law.102 As of January 2012, thirty states had enacted voter identification requirements in 
order to register to vote.103 Due to the speed of expansion of these new voter identification laws, several 
challenges to their validity have been brought before the nation’s courts.  
B.  Challenges to State Voter ID Laws 
There have been various challenges to the constitutionality of voter identification requirements 
in numerous states since the passage of HAVA, and the results have not been consistent.104 Because of 
the similarities between different state laws, it may be helpful to understand the legal claims that have 
been made and the different holdings reached by courts in different states in order to highlight the 
inconsistencies between both the laws and the decisions. This Section will provide the relevant facts and 
statutory issues surrounding key decisions in Georgia, Missouri, and Indiana. These cases were selected 
because each one was heavily litigated and appealed, and together they paint a broad picture of how the 
courts have approached voter identification laws around the country. The cases also show the variety of 
approaches that courts can take when analyzing these laws, each of which will be addressed below with 
regard to the Wisconsin voter identification law. 
1.  Georgia 
Three years after the passage of HAVA, Georgia’s passage of a highly restrictive photo 
identification requirement rendered Georgia the second state to make the presentation of a photo ID an 
absolute requirement in order to cast a ballot in elections.105 This 2005 law was possibly the strictest 
voter identification regulation to be passed after HAVA; it gave no opportunity for free photo 
identifications to individuals who could not afford them, and it allowed no provisional ballot option to 
those arriving at polling locations without proper identification.106 The legislature even voted to increase 
the costs of existing photo identifications along with passage of the law.107 The plaintiffs in this suit, 
consisting mostly of Black and African American civil rights groups such as the NAACP, claimed that 
this law violated the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
                                                      
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(3)(B) (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A) (2002). 
99 See Election Reform, supra note 88, at 6 (explaining various provisions in the Help America Vote Act and how 
the states tackled issues they had). 
100 See id. at 39–72 (showing that before the passage of HAVA very few states had any type of mandatory 
showing of voter identification). 
101 See id. at 13–14. 
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 15484 (2002). 
103 See Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 81. 
104 To develop a deeper understanding of the various cases across the country that concern election law, see 
Election Law @ Moritz, OHIO STATE U. MORITZ COLL. OF LAW, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
105 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (N. D. Ga. 2006). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1304–05. 
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Voting Rights Act of 1965.108 The district court preliminarily enjoined the law, finding that the plaintiffs 
had a substantial likelihood of success on their claims.109 The court agreed with the claim that the law 
placed undue burdens on citizens and operated as a poll tax,110 and provided several examples of the 
types of undue burdens placed on citizens:  
Many voters who do not have driver’s licenses, passports, or other forms of 
photographic identification have no transportation to a voter registrar’s office or DDS 
service center, have impairments that preclude them from waiting in often-lengthy lines 
to obtain Voter ID cards or Photo ID cards, or cannot travel to a registrar’s office or a 
DDS service center during those locations’ usual hours of operation because the voters 
do not have transportation available. . . . [M]any voters who lack an acceptable Photo ID 
for in-person voting are elderly, infirm, or poor, and lack reliable transportation to a 
county registrar’s office. For those voters, requiring them to obtain a Voter ID card . . . 
is unduly burdensome.111 
Even though the district court found that the law served only to disenfranchise citizens, legislators did 
not give up and created an amended version very quickly. 
In January of the following year, the Georgia legislature passed a new law that repealed the 2005 
version and added provisions to fill some of the holes that the court had found in the law’s 
predecessor.112 Under the new law, citizens could present one of many forms of photo ID when 
attempting to vote,113 and a new acceptable form of identification was to be offered for free to 
individuals who could provide the proper documentation.114 For voters who had no form of photo 
identification, the administrative regulations allowed the presentation of documents such as birth 
certificates, prior year’s tax returns, or marriage certificates as proof of identity.115 For voters who could 
not verify their identities, the new law allowed provisional ballots that would be counted if the voters’ 
identities could be proved within a specified timeline.116 
The same plaintiffs claimed that the 2006 law violated the Georgia Constitution, the Fourteenth 
and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.117 
This time, the district court ruled that it would be a stretch to consider burdens such as the gathering of 
documentation or the travel time expended to get to an approved location as poll taxes,118 and it rejected 
                                                      
108 Id. at 1297. 
109 Id. at 1298. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1345. 
112 Id. at 1305. 
113 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417(a) (West 2006). 
114 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417.1 (West 2006). 
115 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 183-1-20.01(4)(b) (West 2006). 
116 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417(b) (West Supp. 2008). 
117 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (N. D. Ga. 2006). 
118 Id. at 1354–55. The court used the reasoning from the Southern District of Indiana in Indiana Democratic 
Party v. Rokita to explain that election laws invariably come with some burden on the voters. The rationale was that 
tangential burdens are not poll taxes, and the cost of time and transportation qualify as tangential and also exist for voter 
registration or in-person voting, thereby disqualifying them as additional burdens. The court went on to say that no 
proof was offered that any individual might have to purchase a birth certificate in order to get the free form of 
identification, invalidating that argument under the poll tax claim. The court did not consider, however, the relative 
number of registration locations or polling locations on Election Day to the number of DMV offices available on a 
given day or in a given county. 
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the arguments that the law violated any of the provisions of the Civil Rights or Voting Rights Acts.119 
The district court also found, however, that the plaintiffs had a valid equal protection claim, because 
even though the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud was “important and legitimate,” the law was 
not narrowly tailored to that interest.120 The district court used the Burdick Test as the standard for 
review.121 It weighed factors such as the weakness of the state’s efforts to educate voters on changes in 
the law, 122 the lack of proof of voter fraud as a problem,123 the availability of less burdensome 
alternatives,124 and the fact that the time period before the election was too brief to pass a law such as 
this one.125 The court made clear that it based this decision in favor of the plaintiffs on the fact that the 
law was not narrowly tailored to the state’s interest, and not on any invalidity of the law itself.126 In fact, 
in response to another challenge to the law the following year, the same court upheld the 
constitutionality of the law, denied a permanent injunction request, and found the law reasonably related 
to the state’s interest.127 In explaining the difference between the 2007 decision and the previous one, the 
court specifically noted the state’s efforts to educate the public about the changes in the law.128 
The 2006 law was again attacked at the state level in 2011, at which point it reached the state 
supreme court.129 Different plaintiffs brought the same claims against the law that had been made in 
2006.130 The court found that the photo ID requirement was a reasonable procedure under the Georgia 
Constitution; that the statute did not deprive voters from casting a ballot and was therefore 
constitutional; and that the requirement was a minimal, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory restriction 
that served the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.131 Georgia’s photo identification law was thus 
upheld by the state’s highest court as valid and constitutional, and has not been challenged since.132 
2.  Missouri 
The same year that Georgia passed its amended photo ID law, the state of Missouri passed its 
own law mandating that voters present valid in-state or federal photo identification in order to vote.133 
The state claimed that this identification requirement was intended to prevent the impersonation of 
registered voters.134 
Missouri’s law required each voter to “present as identification a document issued by the state or 
federal governments that contains the person’s name as listed in the voter registration records, the 
                                                      
119 Id. at 1355–58. 
120 Id. at 1350–51. 
121 Id. Under the Burdick Test, the court must “weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent 
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” 
122 Id. at 1346–47. 
123 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N. D. Ga. 2006). 
124 Id. at 1351. 
125 Id. at 1351–52. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1337. 
128 Id. at 1378–79. 
129 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 74–75. 
132 Id. at 75. 
133 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204–06 (Mo. 2006). 
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person’s photograph, and an expiration date.”135 The law allowed the casting of provisional ballots if 
voters would sign an affidavit swearing that they did not have, or were not able to obtain, a proper photo 
ID due to religious beliefs, disability, or a birthdate on or before 1941.136 The law also gave those 
without proper photo identification and without the means to obtain it the option to request a free non-
driver’s license.137 The legislature even provided mobile processing units that would be made available 
upon request to the disabled and elderly for the distribution of such licenses.138 
What the law did not provide was a method for individuals who did not possess the necessary 
documents, such as birth certificates or marriage licenses, to acquire a valid photo ID without having to 
pay for it.139 The law also only allowed provisional ballots to be circulated to people who met specific 
conditions that did not include common problems such as a lack of funds or difficulty in navigating the 
process of obtaining a proper identification,140 and required a signature for each of these ballots.141 The 
signature provided on the affidavit had to match the signature on file with the election authority, and the 
law did not provide an alternative for disabled individuals who were unable to produce the same 
signature or for those whose signatures had changed.142 
The state supreme court struck down the law as unconstitutional.143 Because the right to vote is a 
fundamental right under the Missouri Constitution, the court applied strict scrutiny to its analysis of the 
law.144 The court examined the monetary and procedural burdens that were placed on citizens and found 
that even the free form of identification came with costs related to the acquisition of proper proof of 
identification.145 The court stated that even though the cost associated with the requirement of a 
document such as a birth certificate or passport does not qualify as a poll tax, “it is a fee that qualified, 
eligible, registered voters who lack an approved photo ID are required to pay in order to exercise their 
right to free suffrage under the Missouri Constitution.”146 In the end, the court decided that the weight 
of the bureaucratic process in place lay unfairly on the shoulders of the poor and the elderly.147 
Even though the court found the state law invalid and unconstitutional, it determined that the 
state’s interest in the prevention of voter fraud was compelling.148 However, it held that the law was not 
narrowly tailored to this interest because the photo ID requirement prevented only in-person fraud and 
did not affect absentee or registration fraud.149 The court further held that state laws enacted after the 
passage of HAVA had already effectively contained voter fraud.150 It then concluded that the law 
violated the Missouri Constitution.151 
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139 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 207–08 (Mo. 2006). 
140 Id. at 206. 
141 Id. at 206–07. 
142 Id. at 207. 
143 Id. at 221–22. 
144 Id. at 215. 
145 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Mo. 2006). 
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the law’s effect on the elderly). 
148 Id. at 217. 
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151 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 222 (Mo. 2006). 
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3.  Indiana 
In 2005, Indiana passed the Senate Enrolled Act No. 483 (SEA 483), which applied to citizens 
voting in person at polling locations during both general and primary elections.152 The law required these 
citizens to present a valid, government-issued photo ID in order to cast their ballots.153 It allowed voters 
with religious objections to being photographed or who could not afford the proper form of 
identification to cast provisional ballots that would be counted if each voter signed an affidavit with the 
circuit court clerk within ten days of the election.154 Voters who claimed to have an appropriate form of 
photo ID but were unable to present it at the polling location could also cast provisional ballots that 
would be counted if they presented it to the county clerk within ten days.155 SEA 483 did not apply to 
absentee ballots and exempted voters living in state-licensed facilities such as nursing homes.156 Voter 
registration did not require a photo ID, and qualified voters able to prove residence and identity could 
obtain free photo identification.157 
The case against Indiana’s law was the first time a specific state voter identification law came 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue before the Court was whether the law requiring government 
issued photo identification to vote violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.158 
In a plurality decision with three justices joining the Court’s opinion, one justice concurring and 
filing a separate opinion, two justices filing one dissent, and one justice filing a separate dissent, the 
Court held that the state interests identified as justifications for the Indiana statute were sufficiently 
weighty to validate any limitation the requirement imposed on voters.159 In announcing the Court’s 
judgment, and writing for Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and himself, Justice Stevens claimed to 
agree with the general rule that “evenhanded restrictions” that protect the “integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process itself” were not invidious and satisfied the standard set forth in Harper.160 This standard 
was that rational restrictions on the right to vote were invidious if not properly related to voter 
qualifications.161 The Court found no such problem with the law at issue and decided that each of 
Indiana’s interests in protecting the electoral process was adequately related to the photo ID 
restrictions. 162  The first valid interest was the state’s desire to detect and deter voter fraud by 
participating in the national effort to reform election procedures that were seen as outdated.163 The next 
valid interest lay in the prevention of voter fraud that might occur due to the high number of names on 
Indiana’s voter registration rolls of individuals who were deceased or who had moved out of state.164 
With regard to this interest, the Court admitted that SEA 483 only addressed in-person voter 
impersonation, which, according to the evidence before the Court, had not actually occurred in any 
Indiana election.165 Justice Stevens nonetheless maintained the validity of the interest by mentioning 
occurrences of this type of fraud in other states and discussing a mayoral race five years earlier that had 
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involved potentially fraudulent absentee voting, a problem not addressed by SEA 483.166 Justice Stevens 
used these examples to demonstrate the reality of the threat of fraud and its potential effect on close 
elections.167 The final state interest the Court addressed was the desire to protect public confidence in 
elections because confidence encouraged participation in the electoral process.168 
In reaching its decision, the Court applied the Burdick Test, weighing the state’s interest against 
the burdens imposed by the law’s requirement.169 In its discussion of possible burdens, the Court found 
that any photo ID requirement would create some type of burden that other methods of identification 
might not.170 It used the example of an individual’s loss of his wallet before voting to explain how 
burdens “arising from life’s vagaries” were not serious or frequent enough to raise constitutional 
questions.171 The Court also found that burdens such as the inconveniences of retrieving a valid ID or 
gathering the documents needed to prove identity are not substantial enough to represent a significant 
increase over normal burdens associated with voting.172 The Court determined that the most significant 
burdens, such as those placed on people who could not afford photo identifications or who could not 
secure any of the required documentation to prove identity, were indeed severe, but that in light of the 
low number of individuals affected by such conditions, these burdens did not establish the grounds 
necessary to strike down the law.173 
IV. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE WISCONSIN VOTER ID LAW 
With a background of the development of laws surrounding suffrage rights over time and 
examples of what courts in other states have decided regarding voter identification laws, this section will 
discuss the voter ID law in Wisconsin and explain how it is invalid. This section will argue that Act 23 
fails to satisfy the Burdick Test as applied by the courts and violates both the U.S. and Wisconsin 
Constitutions. 
A.  The Law 
In May 2011, the Wisconsin legislature passed Act 23, a law that changed the state’s rules 
regarding voters, voting, registration, and identification cards.174 The Act requires voters to present one 
of nine possible forms of identification at polling locations in order to vote: 
1) A Wisconsin driver’s license issued by the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (WisDOT); 
2) A photo identification carded issued by WisDOT; 
3) A U.S. uniformed service identification card; 
4) A U.S. passport; 
5) A U.S. naturalization certificate issued within two years of the election where the 
certificate is being presented; 
6) An unexpired driving receipt issued by WisDOT; 
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7) An unexpired identification card receipt issued by WisDOT; 
8) An identification card issued by a federally recognized Indian tribe in Wisconsin; 
or 
9) An unexpired Wisconsin university or college identification card with a signature 
and an issuance date and expiration date no more than two years apart.175 
The Act also requires voters either to reside in a district for twenty-eight consecutive days or to 
vote from their previous address. New residents who move into the state within twenty-eight days of the 
election are not eligible to vote for any office except that of President and Vice President.176 Act 23 does 
not require a photo ID for registration forms, and it allows exceptions for groups of voters traditionally 
unable to vote, such as the indefinitely confined (e.g. nursing home residents).177 It also requires all 
absentee voters not explicitly exempted from the Act to present an approved photo ID with their 
absentee ballot requests.178 Students using the approved form of university or college ID also have to 
provide proof of their current enrollment at the time of an election.179 The ballots of voters who fail to 
show an appropriate form of photo identification must be set aside as provisional and counted only if 
such voters present such identification to the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners by 4:00 
p.m. on the Friday immediately following the election.180 Those with religious beliefs that prevent them 
from being photographed may be exempted from the photo ID requirement if they sign an affidavit 
identifying the religion and its tenets that prohibit photography.181 Finally, eligible voters will not be 
charged a fee for an approved photo ID if they request the available free version at the time of 
application.182  
This list of rules that Wisconsin voters must follow imposes previously nonexistent obstacles to 
the exercise of their suffrage rights. Act 23 makes voting so much more difficult that it fails to satisfy the 
Burdick Test, because the burdens the law places on citizens far outweigh the state’s interests.  
B.  Burdick Test 
The court in Burdick laid out a four-step process to determine the constitutionality of a law 
affecting voting rights: first, an analysis of the gravity of the injury to the rights in question; second, a 
consideration of the character and magnitude of the injury; third, an evaluation of the state interest being 
pursued; and fourth, a balancing of these elements to determine whether the state’s interest is sufficient 
to justify the burdens on voters.183 
1.  Burdens 
A claim against Wisconsin’s Act 23 might be filed on the ground that the Act places undue 
burdens on the right to vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The burdens that the Act imposes inflict harsh injuries, especially on minority, poor, and elderly citizens. 
This section will argue that these burdens are so severe that they may prevent eligible Wisconsin voters 
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from exercising their right to vote, and in some cases may even remove that right from those who have 
been voting for years without the currently required documentation. 
The first burden is the travel associated with acquiring one of the types of identification needed 
to cast a ballot under Act 23.184 Each one of the seventy-two counties in Wisconsin may have well over 
ten congressional districts, but some have as few as one Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office.185 
The burden of having to go to a DMV in order to obtain a photo ID is drastically different from that 
imposed by the previous law, under which voters could both register to vote and cast their ballots at one 
of the several polling locations in each congressional district by providing acceptable forms of proof of 
residence, which could be as simple as residential leases or a utility bills.186 Adams County, for example, 
had twenty polling locations in September 2010187 and has only one DMV office.188 Crawford County 
also has only one DMV office,189 and it had twenty-one polling locations listed for the 2012 elections.190 
The statistics for other counties are similar. When combined with the facts that over fifty of Wisconsin’s 
seventy-two counties had no available county-wide or multi-county public transit system in 2012,191 that 
over 600,000 citizens of the state live below the poverty line,192 and that over 780,000 citizens are over 
sixty-five years old,193 the statistics indicate that this law is likely to disenfranchise many voters. These 
hundreds of thousands of low-income and elderly citizens may well be the majority of those who do not 
own or cannot operate cars and who will be disenfranchised by the requirement that they obtain a 
proper photo ID. These groups, Black or African Americans, the poor and the elderly, are also most 
likely not to possess already one of the nine forms of approved identification,194 either because they have 
no need for a car or because they cannot afford one.195 
Another of Act 23’s disenfranchising injuries is the cost of obtaining an approved photo ID. 
One must pay a fee of twenty-eight dollars to obtain an original Wisconsin driver’s license, thirty-four 
dollars to renew a license, fourteen dollars to obtain a duplicate, and fifteen dollars to take the necessary 
skills exam.196 For twenty-eight dollars, the state also issues identification cards that are approved, non-
driver’s licenses,197 and the more involved process of obtaining a passport includes a fee of 165 
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dollars.198 The remaining forms of approved photo ID involve unique and detailed processes that do not 
apply to the majority of the population.199 
Along with the identifications that come with a fee, the state also offers a free form of 
identification that can be used for voting.200 However, there are still costs associated with the free form 
of ID because citizens applying for the ID must prove, through original documentation, their name and 
date of birth, their legal status in the country, their identity, and their Wisconsin residency.201 Each of 
these four categories must be proved individually, and each has its own specific set of required authentic 
documents.202 To prove name and date of birth, the only permissible forms of documentation are a 
certified birth certificate, a certificate of citizenship, a foreign passport, a TSA worker ID, or a valid court 
order.203 Since the last four documents in the list likely apply only to a miniscule portion of the 
population, the only document relevant to the majority is the birth certificate. To obtain a birth 
certificate in the state of Wisconsin, one must pay a fee of twenty dollars and prove one’s identity;204 the 
primary forms of identification for this purpose are a driver’s or non-driver’s license with a photo.205 
These two types of proof are thus inherently irrelevant to voters applying for a free photo ID, because if 
they had one, they would not be applying in the first place. Secondary forms of identification, of which 
two types must be presented, include passports, major credit cards, checkbooks, government photo IDs, 
health insurance cards, recent leases, utility bills, or traffic tickets. Some of these types of documentation 
(traffic tickets, utility bills, and leases) require a photo ID to obtain them at the outset, so this list, too, is 
limited. Those most likely to need a free form of identification, the poor and the elderly, are also the 
most likely not to have access to their birth certificates and thus the most likely to go through this 
process. 206  Voters born before birth certificate records were kept, who were never issued birth 
certificates, or who were issued incorrect certificates, have no relief under Act 23.207  
In order to obtain a free photo ID, then, Wisconsin citizens must present their birth certificate at 
some point in the process. If such an individual does not already have one, he or she must pay a twenty-
dollar fee to obtain a new one and compile separate forms of identification to prove his or her identity. 
In other words, the photo ID that is supposed to be free for those who need it could potentially require 
the payment of twenty dollars and the presentation of two forms of identification (secondary forms) in 
order to get the identification (birth certificate) needed to get the identification (free photo ID) needed 
to exercise the fundamental right to vote. Therefore, in reality, it may be impossible for many Wisconsin 
citizens who need the “free” ID option to take advantage of it. 
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Moreover, the cost of obtaining a birth certificate only serves the purpose of proving name and 
date of birth along with legal presence.208 One must also prove identity and Wisconsin residency in order 
to get a valid photo ID; additional documents are required to satisfy those categories.209 Procurement of 
these other necessary documents may not come with the same hassle associated with a birth certificate, 
but the effect is the same. Those who are most likely to need free photo IDs—African Americans, the 
poor, and the elderly—are those who are the least likely to have the documents necessary to acquire such 
IDs.210 This is especially true in the many cases in which the standard in place requires an existing form 
of photo ID to get the free photo ID. 
The costs of the burdens imposed by Act 23 are not just monetary but also practical. To acquire 
an approved photo ID, a citizen must travel to a state-operated DMV office. Aside from the practical 
and financial difficulties associated with getting to one of these offices are those associated with the 
hours during which these offices are open. None of the DMV offices are open on weekends, few are 
open past 5:00 p.m., many are open only two or three times a week, and several are open only two or 
three times a month.211 The majority of the offices are open from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on their days of 
operation,212 but these are the working hours of most citizens. Moreover, citizens who do not already 
have valid forms of photo identification are legally unable to drive, so getting to the DMV offices when 
they are open becomes a compounded burden on those who can least afford it. It is also well-known that 
a trip to the DMV is often one of hours, not minutes, and that once a citizen has successfully applied for 
a proper ID, there is usually a waiting period before he or she receives it.213 
2.  State Interest 
Wisconsin has interests in preserving the electoral integrity of the state, in preventing and 
deterring voter fraud, and in boosting voter confidence through the execution of a more structured 
electoral system. 
3.  Balancing Test 
In order to determine how to balance the burdens that a law like Act 23 imposes on citizens 
against the interests of the state, the first step is to look at the injuries that result from the burdens 
imposed.214 When the restrictions on voters’ rights are severe, the law must be necessary and narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest; if the impositions are reasonable and nondiscriminatory, 
an important state interest is sufficient to sustain the law.215 Since the burdens imposed by Act 23 are 
severe, a court would be most likely to apply the more stringent level of scrutiny, and determine that the 
Act must be both necessary and narrowly tailored to advance Wisconsin’s compelling interests. This 
section will argue that an application of the balancing test to Act 23 demonstrates that the law’s burdens 
on citizens far outweigh its benefits to the state. The section will then address possible 
counterarguments, along with their merits and their likelihood of success in court. 
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By passing Act 23, Wisconsin’s legislature imposed an undue burden on the fundamental right to 
vote, which may well violate the Equal Protection Clause by disparately impacting suspect classes of 
citizens—namely African Americans, the poor, and the elderly—in a way that reveals discriminatory 
intent. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the right to vote is a fundamental right provided by 
the state constitution, and that any statute that “denies a qualified elector the right to vote is 
unconstitutional” and void.216 This ruling applies directly to Act 23. The state’s new voter ID provisions 
require every individual voter to present one of nine forms of approved photo identification, the most 
frequently used being a state driver’s or non-driver’s license.217 As mentioned earlier, twelve percent of 
Wisconsin’s population lives below the poverty line and fourteen percent is over sixty-five years of 
age.218 Though it is likely that many of these citizens, especially the elderly, are registered voters who 
have been voting for years, this law will keep them from exercising that right. The Missouri Supreme 
Court, considering a similar set of facts in Weinschenk v. State, found that a denial of suffrage to this extent 
imposed more than a de minimis burden and struck down the voter identification law in question.219 
For citizens who do not have any appropriate form of identification, the process for obtaining 
one is arduous and time-consuming. In order to apply for a driver’s license, a non-driver’s license, a 
passport, or even a free photo ID, citizens must offer documents of proof of identity before their ID 
applications will be accepted.220 The easiest and most common document proving identity is a birth 
certificate, which comes with its own set of requirements and fees.221 The result is that potential voters 
will have to show identification to retrieve the identification necessary to obtain the identification 
necessary to vote, even when attempting to acquire the free form of photo ID. This burden may impose 
an injury as severe as complete disenfranchisement. Citizens who are otherwise eligible to vote will be 
unable to exercise that right because they cannot afford ID fees, find a way to make it to a DMV office 
when one is open, or provide the documentation needed to apply for an approved photo ID.  
Because of the severe nature of the burdens placed on citizens by the requirements of Act 23, 
strict scrutiny must apply to the state’s law, which thus must be necessary and narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest. 222  The interests in preserving electoral integrity, preventing fraud, and 
increasing voter confidence and participation are all compelling state interests; however, the 
requirements of Act 23 are not tailored narrowly enough to those goals. 
Act 23 directly addresses possible fraud by in-person voters and by absentee voters, but it does 
not address fraud issues concerning double voters or convicts voting illegally. According to the 
Wisconsin Constitution, those convicted of felonies may be excluded from suffrage rights.223 In 2004, a 
number of inmates signed up to vote using absentee ballots; though several of the inmates were felons 
and thus ineligible to vote,224 a small number of these ineligible inmates cast their ballots without being 
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caught, including one who presented a Department of Correction identification card with the word 
“offender” on it at the polling location.225 Act 23 addresses neither this type of fraud nor that 
perpetrated by double voters. In the same 2004 elections, dozens of voters registered twice and were 
listed twice on the state’s registration rolls.226 Double registration is easily accomplished by registering at 
two separate locations due to the common occurrence of different people’s having the same name 
and/or birthday. Act 23 does nothing to prevent this type of fraud, either. 
Not only is Act 23 unable to address these types of fraud, but it is also unnecessary to the 
achievement of its purported goals. A law cannot be narrowly tailored to the accomplishment of an 
interest if it is unnecessary. The 2004 election in Wisconsin was a hot button issue due to the wide 
allegations of fraud and the accompanying legislative pressures to pass more restrictive identification 
requirements.227 The concerns about fraud spurred an investigation into the election that uncovered a 
total of only seven individuals who knowingly cast invalid ballots; all of them had felony convictions.228 
These seven cases equated to 0.0002% of Wisconsin’s votes.229 With this rate of fraud, a voter would be 
thirty-nine times more likely to be struck by lightning than to commit voter fraud.230 Because such fraud 
is thus not a problem in Wisconsin, Act 23 is an unnecessary law. The Act is even more irrelevant 
because HAVA would likely resolve the miniscule fraud problems that do exist, or would at least prevent 
as much fraud as Act 23.231 The 2002 federal law, as discussed above, requires voters to present proof of 
identity or residence at polling locations and requires the computerization of both statewide voter 
registration lists and mail-in registration.232 The modernization of the system would help to keep out 
potential double voters, and HAVA’s broader list of approved photo identifications would place fewer 
burdens on voters. 
Though it goes without saying that Wisconsin has compelling interests in maintaining a fair 
electoral system, Act 23 sweeps too broadly to justify the burdens it imposes. Act 23 does not meet the 
necessary and narrowly tailored standard because it does not prevent the only type of fraud that has been 
relevant in the state. Act 23 is, moreover, unnecessary in light of the facts that the low incidence of fraud 
that has been discovered indicates that fraud is not actually an issue in the state, and that HAVA already 
provides a more effective way to address the state’s interests.  
C.  Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
Act 23 also violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment through its imposition of a poll tax. With 
only limited exceptions, voters without approved photo IDs must spend money to obtain the necessary 
supporting documentation. The supposedly “free” photo ID option is irrelevant and imaginary because 
voters attempting to procure such an ID will still incur costs to produce the other necessary documents. 
According to the Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia,233 “[w]ealth or fee-paying has . . . no relation to 
voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened.”234 Under Act 
23’s approved photo ID requirement, however, most eligible voters in Wisconsin will have to pay a fee 
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to exercise the right to suffrage.235 Moreover, the citizens who currently lack proper identification are 
those least capable of bearing the cost. For the hundreds of thousands of Wisconsin citizens living below 
the poverty line, a twenty-dollar fee for a birth certificate is a severe burden to endure. In 1956, the 
Supreme Court found that the exercise of fundamental rights cannot be conditioned upon financial 
expense.236 Under Act 23, however, citizens without an approved photo ID must incur costs to exercise 
their indisputably fundamental right to vote. The Act disenfranchises those who cannot afford such 
costs, thereby stripping them of a right guaranteed to them by the constitutions of both the state and the 
country. 
Wisconsin’s Act 23 not only fails to meet the constitutional standards of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment, but it is also invalid under the Wisconsin constitution. The state legislature’s passage of the 
Act was an abuse of discretion under the language of the state constitution.237 
D.  Wisconsin Constitution 
The Wisconsin constitution’s provisions on suffrage are very specific, and invalidate Act 23 both 
on its merits and with regard to how it was passed into law. The discussion above addresses a federal 
constitutional approach; this section will argue the invalidity of Act 23 from the perspective of the state’s 
constitution. 
Article 3 of the Wisconsin constitution sets out the rules of suffrage for the state. Section 1 of 
the article specifies who qualifies as an elector, and its language is clear: “Every United States citizen age 
18 or older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that district.”238 
Section 2 supplies more detail. It states that suffrage laws may only be enacted if they define residency, 
provide for registration of electors and for absentee voting, exclude specific persons under specific 
conditions, and are subject to ratification by the people in a general election in the event of an extension 
of voting rights to additional classes.239 The persons who may have their suffrage rights removed are 
those convicted of a felony, unless restored to civil rights, and those determined by a court to be fully or 
partially incompetent, if such persons do not understand the elective process.240 
Article 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not provide that the state legislature can exclude 
citizens from the right to participate in the electoral process for any reason not listed in Section 2(4). The 
article also does not give the legislature the right to add to the qualifications listed in Section 1. Act 23, 
however, made both of these errors. The Act creates a separate class of citizens, those without a specific 
type of photo ID, and excludes them from the voting process. Unless these individuals are felons or 
incompetent, such exclusion violates Section 2. The exclusion also violates Section 1’s mandate that, 
barring the listed exceptions, all that is required to be a qualified voter is U.S. citizenship, an age of at 
least eighteen, and residency in the district where one’s ballot is cast. 
Wisconsin Act 23 is thus unconstitutional as a violation not only of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but also of 
the Wisconsin Constitution’s Article 3, Sections 1 and 2. 
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E.  Possible Arguments Made by Proponents of Act 23 
The main argument put forth by Act 23’s proponents is the importance of the state’s interests in 
protecting the electoral process and preventing fraud. As discussed above, this argument does not meet 
the standards needed to justify the injuries sustained by Wisconsin citizens. Furthermore, fraud in the 
system is virtually nonexistent. The 2004 elections in Wisconsin involved a significant number of fraud 
allegations and a heightened debate about voter ID regulations because two years after the passage of 
HAVA, proponents of stricter photo ID requirements saw an opportunity to get such provisions 
passed. 241  The truth about the amount of fraud in that election, however, is unimpressive and 
unpersuasive. Throughout the general election, there were only nineteen substantiated cases of votes cast 
by ineligible voters; eleven from Milwaukee alone (all cast by felons) and eight throughout the rest of the 
state (two cast by felons, one by a foreign national, one by a seventeen-year-old child, and four ballots by 
deceased voters).242 Only seven of these votes were actually counted, and Act 23 would have prevented 
none. The total number of fraud allegations in the election was 6,877, under categories of unprocessed 
registration cards, flawed addresses, convicted criminals, double voters, and fictitious voters.243 Even if 
all of these allegations had been accurate and had been counted, which they were not, the total number 
still would have equaled only 0.2% of the state’s votes, and Act 23 would have prevented none of them. 
Proponents of the law might also point to Crawford v. Marion County, in which the Supreme Court 
held that Indiana’s interest in preventing fraud was both neutral and sufficiently strong to require 
rejection of such attacks on the statute in question.244 Indiana’s law is similar to that of Wisconsin in that 
both require proof of identification through a photo ID. Unlike Indiana, however, the evidence of fraud 
in Wisconsin is far from strong, and Act 23’s implicit requirement that a select class of citizens pay some 
amount in order to vote leans more in the direction of its functioning as the equivalent of a poll tax, in 
violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  
On their faces, the laws (and to a certain extent the burdens) appear similar, but there are key 
differences that would likely lead the Court to a different conclusion regarding Act 23 than that reached 
in Crawford. The first difference is that Indiana’s law allowed citizens who could in no way afford the 
costs associated with voting to still vote successfully. Under the law’s indigent provision, each destitute 
voter had the option of casting a ballot and then executing an affidavit with the clerk explaining his or 
her situation.245 Upon completion of such an affidavit, the vote would be counted without any monetary 
costs to the voter. Wisconsin’s Act 23 includes no such provision. Another difference is that the Court is 
unlikely to apply the same heavy emphasis on the burden of proof to Act 23 that it applied to Indiana’s 
law. The Court determined that the petitioners in the Indiana case bore a heavy burden of persuasion 
because they were waging a broad attack on the law.246 The petitioners ultimately failed to produce 
enough evidence to convince the Court that the law imposed a severe burden on voters, so the Court 
concluded that only a limited burden existed that did not require narrow tailoring or a compelling 
interest.247 The facts are not the same in Wisconsin because Act 23 does not include an indigent 
provision and because the nearly one million poor and elderly voters affected by its requirements will 
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certainly be able to provide enough evidentiary examples to convince a court that the law imposes severe 
injuries. Justice Stevens himself differentiated between the severe burdens that might be imposed on 
certain voters and the relative inconveniences that would be placed on others.248 The differences 
between the burdens in Indiana and those in Wisconsin are not important; what matters is the 
application of the two laws and how those burdens become severe for hundreds of thousands of 
affected people in Wisconsin and the lack of an indigent provision that would otherwise allow them to 
vote. In Crawford, the Court said that trips to the DMV and the gathering of appropriate documents 
would not be a substantial burden for many, but that they might be heavier for others due to economic 
or other personal limitations.249 The difference between the case in Indiana and that in Wisconsin is that 
the Crawford Court determined that any significant burden would be placed only on a limited number of 
people.250 However, variances in the two laws and, possibly, in the demography of the two states, will 
cause the number of people affected by the “inconveniences” stated in Crawford to be numerous; the 
effect will be that of a substantial burden for many because the hundreds of thousands of affected 
potential voters will either fall into the economic pool that cannot afford to obtain any form of 
identification or the age pool that has neither proper documentation nor the means to acquire it. 
Act 23 does not stand up to the burden analysis of the Burdick Test because it is not necessary 
and narrowly tailored enough to justify the devastating Equal Protection injuries it inflicts on the voting 
population. The Act is also unconstitutional because its requirements effectively impose a poll tax on 
citizens without photo identification and without the necessary supporting documentation, in violation 
of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Act 23 also violates the Wisconsin Constitution because it excludes 
voters from the suffrage process and adds qualifications to the definition of an elector in a way that the 
state’s article on suffrage does not prescribe. Act 23 is thus invalid on several grounds and will serve only 
to prevent qualified voters from exercising their rights. It should therefore be struck down. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States is a fairly young nation, but it is one with a rich history and a great deal of 
promise. The cliché that history repeats itself and that the collective “we” should learn from it and not 
let the worst of it happen again, while overused, is still an axiom to be followed. Laws such as 
Wisconsin’s Act 23 come dangerously close to allowing some of the worst parts of our history to rise 
again. 
Voting rights in this country, as they exist today, are the result of a complicated past. The 
country initially allowed only wealthy white men to participate in the electoral process. Later 
amendments to the Constitution allowed white women, and, theoretically, African Americans to enjoy 
suffrage rights, but the sanctioning of suffrage laws affecting only the latter soon thwarted these rights. 
The rationality and fairness of voting laws finally began to even out in the middle of the twentieth 
century, but it appears that certain states are again seeking to displace the suffrage rights of specific 
groups of voters. 
This Note is not intended to be political in its scope, but one cannot help but notice the 
relationship between the passage of strict voter identification requirements in the states and the political 
party in power at the time. Act 23 was not passed in Wisconsin until there was a Republican governor 
and a Republican-run legislature. In fact, when Act 23 was passed in 2011, the state assembly adopted 
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only one out of 376 bill amendments proposed by Democrats.251 In 2008, the following groups voted 
Democrat: seventy-three percent of families making less than $15,000 per year; sixty-three percent of 
those who did not graduate from high school; fifty-four percent of voters in the Midwest; sixty-six 
percent of voters under thirty years old; sixty-seven percent of Hispanic voters; and ninety-five percent 
of Black and African American voters.252 These happen to be the same groups whose members are most 
likely not to possess a proper photo ID and to be unable to afford the costs associated with retrieving 
one.253 The reader can draw his or her own conclusions about this happenstance. 
Act 23 places extraordinary burdens on those listed above who seek to exercise their 
constitutional right to vote. The Act places the poor, many of whom are African American, into a 
position of marginalization that is at odds with our historical struggle against racial inequality. Potentially 
hundreds of thousands of eligible and registered voters may find themselves in a situation in which, 
unable to obtain an appropriate photo ID, they will be unable to cast their ballots. This would be a 
tragedy and a return to a period in history that should not be revisited.  
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